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ABSTRACT
The fact that major fires are rare events in underground metal mines means there is often little on-site experience in
dealing with these situations. Elaborate strategies that rely on a high degree of training at all levels to be effective are
likely to fail, especially with the trend in Australia towards smaller mines and "fly in-fly out" operations. A robust strategy is required. The key items in such a strategy are: early detection and warning of personnel, personal belt-worn oxygen-generating self-rescuers, high integrity escape routes and self-contained refuge stations, simple procedures, reliable
personnel ''tagging" systems and sufficient, trained, search and rescue and fire fighting personnel and equipment.
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INTRODUCTION
A major underground mine fire is the nightmare scenario
for any mine worker or mine manager. The hazards from a
major mine fire have increased substantially over the past
few decades with the enormous increase in electrical and
diesel equipment in underground metal mines. The mobility
of the workforce has also increased with mechanisation and
the introduction of adits and ramps for many underground
mines which would have been shaft-access only in the past.
However, new and increasingly "useable" technology such
as lightweight, oxygen-generating self-rescuers, throughthe-rock communication and more effective refuge chambers are also influencing egress strategies. Finally, community expectations and tolerance have changed significantly
over the past few decades, with multiple mine fatalities now
a completely unacceptable outcome even in the event of a
serious mine fire. All these factors result in the need to totally review the strategies which the mining industry uses to
deal
with
major
underground
mine
fires.
The Enterprise mine project (EMP) is located at Mount lsa,
Australia, and is wholly owned by Mount lsa Mines Limited. It is being developed, at a cost of $330 million, from
about l ,OOOm below surface to 1,700 m below surface and
over the next 15 years, will extend to 2,000 m below surface. The project is designed to upgrade the existing 1.5
Mtpa operation to 3.5 Mtpa. Expected completion for the

development and construction program is late calender
1999. During construction, the underground workforce will
peak at 700 persons, with a workforce of 400 required during on-going production.
In June 1997, the Enterprise Mine Project (EMP) completed a risk assessment of all activities in the project. On a
scale of 1 (negligible risk) to 25 (extreme risk), emergency
egress was scored at 22.
Shortly after this, the Moura No 2 Inquiry was completed. This was an inquiry into an underground coal mine
explosion in 1994 in Australia in which eleven persons died
(out of 21 underground at the time). One of the key recommendations from the Inquiry was that every mine (coal and
non-coal) should undertake a risk review to identify the
"one or two" credible disaster scenarios relevant to their
situation and ensure an effective plan exists to reduce the
risk and consequence of disaster. The inquiry noted that a
reduction in lost time injury frequency rate (L TIFR) will not
necessarily translate into a reduced risk of catastrophes.
This is because the very low-probability, high-consequence
nature of a disaster requires a different focus and management strategy to a reduction in LTIFR.
Despite no catastrophic disaster at the Mount Isa (Isa)
underground mines in their 75 years of operation, and despite the very large mines and workforce over these years,
there are a number of reasons why emergency egress at
EMP rated this score.
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THE FIRE HAZARD
Early in the study, it was recognised that a major fire was
the most credible emergency egress situation in the EMP.
This is because humans can only survive a few minutes with
insufficient oxygen, and can only survive for as little as
seconds when some poisonous products of combustion
(POC) enter the lungs 1 • Underground mine fires consume
large quantities of oxygen (potentially producing oxygen
deficient atmospheres) and produce large volumes of carbon
dioxide 2 and carbon monoxide; plus many other toxic gases.
Any other credible disaster scenario at EMP provides a
longer safe response time than a frre 3 • Moreover, because
the ventilating air enters all the workings, a fire is the only
credible hazard with the potential to affect a large number
of persons.
This conclusion is consistent with experience in the
USA which shows that, despite underground mining contributing only a very small percentage of industrial output,
of the 98 industrial fires from 1900 to 1990 which resulted
in 50 or more deaths, 51 of these fires occurred in mines
(Hartman, eta/., 1997).
The Enterprise mine is situated below the existing copper and lead mines and is therefore potentially affected by
any fire or other disaster in these mines. Because there was
extensive infrastructure already existing in these mines
(hoisting facilities, ventilation shafts, etc., and because these
mines are now winding down and have surplus capacity, it
was decided to extend these existing shafts into the EMP,
rather than create new, dedicated EMP shafts direct to surface. This has reduced the standalone ability of the EMP.
Virgin rock temperatures (VRT) at EMP are 55° at 1.35
km and will be 68° at 2 km. This is higher than VRTs at
most underground operations in the world, including South
Africa. Combined with very high surface summer temperatures, failure of the ventilation or 40 MWr refrigeration
system results in rapid increases in temperature under1 There is little information available about the actual timedependent concentrations of POCs produced in underground mine
fires. However, extensive work has been done measuring, over
time, the production of POCs in the cabins of wide-body aircraft.
These indicate that concentrations of HCL and HF exceed allowable concentrations within 30 seconds of ignition, and that CO and
C02 concentrations are three to 12 times the short-term exposure
limits within 60 seconds of ignition (Sarkos et al 1982).
2 Carbon dioxide is twenty times more soluble in blood than is
oxygen. Haemoglobin has an affinity for carbon monoxide about
300 times that of its affinity for oxygen, plus haemoglobin is unstable - therefore releases oxygen readily - whereas carboxyhaemoglobin is stable and therefore accumulates in the blood.
3

This, of course, will not necessarily be true of other mines.

ground, which has a major effect on egress strategy. Furthennore, to avoid adding additional heat into the fresh air
intakes, the EMP ventilation system is based on an "exhausting only" principle; this is in contrast to the "pushpull" systems used earlier at Isa. A push-pull system (which
includes a surface fan to push air underground) provides a
highly secure "fresh air base" at the offtake on each sublevel from each fresh air shaft. An exhausting system operates under negative pressure and therefore is more risky.
However, if it operates with a dedicated and highly secure
system of intake airways, it provides almost the same level
of safety as a positive pressure system. For refrigerated
mines, an exhausting system is usually used along with direct forcing ventilation from the intakes using auxiliary fans
and flexible ducts. This minimises temperatures at the
workplace but significantly reduces the security of the air
intakes as a frre on one level could result in failure of one or
more of the auxiliary fans which, even with self-closing
dampers, could result in air reversals and entry of combustion products into the intakes.
It must be emphasised that if a serious fire breaks out
underground, lives are immediately in danger and the risk to
life and health is very high, even with the best of emergency
plans. Therefore preventing fires is and must remain the
highest priority in terms of egress strategy. However, the lsa
mines have a good record in preventing serious fires underground and, while it was recognised that these existing
measures also need to be reviewed, the most urgent issue
was identified as being the contingency plan in the event of
a major underground fire.

OVERALL PHILOSOPHY
There were some guiding principles required in the design
of any emergency system at EMP. These were based on the
fact that a disaster scenario, almost by definition, has a very
low probability of ever happening, and will therefore be
outside the experience of most mine workers and managers.
These principles include:
• The acceptable level of risk. At EMP, it was decided to
start from the presumption that "there should be negligible
risk of any further harm to anyone as a result of the disas·
ter". In other words, people may have been injured in the
initial incident which gave rise to the disaster (e.g., burns)
but there should be no further harm to themselves or others
resulting from the POCs from the fire. The very fact that a
major disaster has occurred underground means "we have
failed once", the egress protocol is to ensure "we do not fail
again".
• A systems approach would be used to ensure the overall
design was integrated, comprehensive and cost effective,
and to get maximum synergy from the various components.
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• The overall system used must have a minimum of complexity for the operators: the "keep it simple" principle.
• The equipment within the system must be able to be
used almost intuitively (e.g., opening and donning of selfrescuers and use of breathable air equipment inside refuge
stations).
• The system and equipment in it must be fail-safe, or
have effective backup.
• Equipment must be easy and inexpensive to maintain.
Where practical, equipment should be "dual-purpose", i.e.,
used for both daily operations and emergencies, as experience shows that equipment which is used for routine operations tends to be better maintained than equipment which
will only ever be used in a "disaster" scenario.
• The systems must provide a high degree of on-going
operational readiness.
• The systems (e.g., escape-ways) must be capable of being traversed by mine workers who meet the minimum
physical fitness requirements for the mine 4• Much of the
work in modem mining is now fairly sedentary and the fitness levels of many miners is poor. They would be unable
to "self-escape" up any significant vertical distance using a
ladder, or even a significant distance of ramp.
• The systems must be able to handle the likely level of
panic and confusion in an emergency, and therefore rely to
the least possible extent on the mine worker's memory or
compliance with procedures for effectiveness.

ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED
An early question asked in the review was ''what are the
fundamental differences between a large underground industrial facility (i.e., a mine) and a large surface industrial
facility (e.g., a skyscraper)". Since the 1800s and before,
mines have considered themselves to be unique and their
problems to be unique. However, in the case of fire procedures, this view of "uniqueness" can no longer be entirely
supported. No one accepts that skyscrapers should have the
same emergency procedures in the 1990s as they did 100
years ago. Technology has changed and community expectations have also changed.
Because above-ground facilities are more numerous than
underground mines, fires in above-ground facilities are also
more common, in absolute numbers, than in underground
mines. Vast experience has been gathered as to the precautions that are required in above-ground facilities to prevent a serious fire resulting in loss of life. These precautions include:

4 There are a variety of these; but the two critical ones in terms
of escape are for workers at EMP to have a maximum BMI (body
mass index) of35 and a minimum V0 2max of30 ml 0/kg/min.
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• Early detection of the fire through smoke and other detectors.
• Activation (automatic) of an alarm system that immediately notifies all potentially affected persons.
• A "fail-safe" non-mechanical second means of egress
which provides quick and/or secure access to safety.
• Sprinkler systems or other frre suppression systems.
• Regular fire drills to ensure all persons know what to do,
where to go, etc.
To some extend these measures have not been adopted
in underground·mines because the technology (e.g., reliable,
instantaneous communications) has not been available in the
past~ however, this is generally no longer true.
It should also be noted that the fire detection, alarming
and suppression systems in most large commercial aboveground buildings constitutes between 2% and 5% of the
total capital cost. Very few underground mines would spend
anywhere between 2% to 5% of the total project cost on fire
prevention and control systems. This is one indication that
the frre hazard in underground mines is not yet fully considered at the feasibility or operational stage.
As discussed earlier, it is rare for anyone underground in
a metal mine to be in danger from the frre itself. It is the
products of combustion (POC) that present the danger. In
many respects the safest thing a person could do in the event
of a serious frre producing lots of POC would be to don a
self-rescuer and wait until the fire went out or was put out.
This is because of the hazard posed by trying to travel
through smoke. The underground environment is generally
unlit. Floors are often rough. Drives are sometimes cluttered
with equipment or conveyors. Visibility in smoke is poor
and sometimes nil. If anyone is in doubt about the visibility
problem when in smoke, a simple test is to tum one's cap
lamp off when underground and notice the immediate disorientation and anxiety that occurs. There is the hazard of
falling down or driving down vertical openings, such as
stopes or passes, even with barricades installed. In nil visibility situations, persons very rapidly become disoriented
and lose direction. Experience at Isa is that workers can
even be mistaken about such basic things as whether they
are travelling up or down a 1 in 7 ramp.
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT APPROACHES
Because of this, a foundation upon which the egress strategy
at lsa in the past has been based is the maxim "Do not enter
·smoke". This presumes there are credible other alternatives,

5 In coal mines, there is also the danger of an explosion or of the
coal seam catching on fire. Plus, there is now great reluctance in
Australia to allow mine rescue teams to enter a coal mine where an
explosive mixture of gases is known to exist. In such circumstances, mine workers must effect their own "self-rescue" (Anon,
1998)
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such as escapeways and entrapped procedures. The "fail
safe" entrapment procedure at Isa has previously been to tie
one's shirt to a compressed air outlet, or to cut a hole in a
vent duct and breath fresh air from the duct. However, these
have serious problems at EMP:
• The standard development size is 5 m x 5 m or larger, so
mine air outlets and vent ducts are normally too high to be
reached without a tall vehicle.
• It is not practical to put air droppers from the compressed air line to ground level frequently enough to provide for entrapment6 •
• With the size of diesel equipment now in operation in
modem mines, a ftre could easily have sufficient heat to
burn out the connections in the mine air lines, to bum the
vent duct or even to reverse the ventilation flow.
• Working places are supplied with refrigerated air directly from fresh air raises using flexible plastic ventilation
ducts. The fresh air raises operate under negative pressure
so a fire in a vent duct which trips out one of the many fans
connected directly to the raise, will result in polluted air reentering the raise, which would compromise the air in the
raise and any other working places fed from the raise.
• With the high temperatures in EMP during summer,
persons need to drink water to maximise their probability of
survival. Water may not be available in either of the above
entrapped procedures.
The issue of "second means of egress" (a statutory requirement) was also given considerable thought during the
review. The ErviP has three main means of egress, these
being a 1 in 10 gradient production ramp, a second 1 in 7
service ramp and an inclined ladderway in a fresh air raise.
Each of these connects most of the main working levels.
However, the reality for EMP, as for all mines, is that the
mining operation itself requires development of new sources
of ore and therefore new working places, many of which
are, at least initially, "dead ends". In fact, the high activity
areas of the mine are often the areas currently being developed and these will rarely have two separate and independent means of egress with separate ventilation. Moreover,
most modem mine workers are not especially fit, and never
use ladders in their ordinary course of work. The necessary
work rate and unfamiliarity of miners with climbing ladders
resulted in the EMP review coming to the following conclusions:
• a second means of egress is required from all main
working areas, but
• the second means of egress is not primarily for workers
to escape; rather it is for access by mine rescue teams to
workers who have taken refuge in safe areas or to search for

and rescue lost or trapped workers, including retrieval of the
injured using stretchers.
This conclusion is endorsed by the South African Mineral Act Regulation 24.20.2 7 which states:
The manager shall see to it that there is a refuge bay or
other safe area in a mine or works within easy reach of
workmen and within the limits of protection afforded by
a rescuing device, in the event of an explosion, fire or
other emergency.
In a metal mine, the most probable cause of a major fire
is either mobile diesel equipment or a conveyor. It was
agreed that the shortest time to detect the fire and communicate the problem to Mine Control8 is ten minutes9 from the
start of the fire.
Isa mine has between six and eight fully trained, volunteer mine rescue crews available (on call) at any given time
plus two full-time mine rescue coordinators. The minimum
time required to assemble a mine rescue crew on the surface
is 20 minutes from notification.
The best response of Mine Rescue is to be underground
and at the fire within another 20 minutes.
By this time, a minimum of 50 minutes has elapsed from
the start of the frre. At this point, any fire on a conveyor or
diesel equipment would be a raging inferno. The best Mine
Rescue could hope to achieve, in terms of putting the ftre
out, is a further two hours; the worst is up to four hours 10 •
Therefore, there are several critical reasons to get people
to safety quickly'':
• To have a truly credible "entrapped" procedure would
require a person to have a fail-safe supply of breathable air
for at least five hours. This rules out even the largest of beltworn, self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs).
• It is difficult, if not impossible for relatively untrained
miners to drink water safely without contaminating their
self-rescuer. If "trapped" in very hot conditions without

6 However, the ' entrapped' procedure using compressed air line
and one's shirt is still taught as development ends often do have
accessible compressed air.

11 Note that the risk of a fire setting off a major explosion is negligible in a metal mine, and therefore there is not the same need as
usually exists in a coal mine to get persons out of the mine.

7 This 1956 Act was replaced with Duty of Care style legislation
in 1991 , but the basic principle remains.
8 Mine Control is a surface control and emergency centre which
is manned continuously.
9 If the fire starts when someone is present, then the first response is to try to put the fire out, usually with two fire extinguishers on larger items of equipment, in addition to engine fire
suppression equipment, where fitted. Hence at least ten minutes
would occur before any phone call could be made.
10 After two hours, most of the fuel and oil on a large piece of
mobile equipment would have burnt out and the fire could be
contained. The four hour scenario assumes the fire is upwind or at
a higher elevation than the fire fighters ; both of these situations
make the fire very difficult to approach or to fight with foam.

AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR EMERGENCY EGRESS
FROM AN UNDERGROUND METAL MINE
water, survival time could be limited by maximum dehydration to 5 to 6 hours (about 10-12% of body weight
(Adolf, 1995)). However, acute thirst will be felt at 4% dehydration, which could be reached within 2 hours, and even
earlier if the worker is already mildly dehydrated before the
emergency occurs, as would often be the case.
• The EMP operation is geographically large, and mine
rescue crews need to know who is unaccounted for, before
starting an effective search and rescue operation. If there are
numerous miners using an "entrapped" procedure and unable to communicate with the surface, then resources and
time will be wasted and lives could be lost.
• Most miners would experience distress and panic if
trapped in smoke for several hours. It is common for persons who wear face masks for several hours to become quite
agitated. There is a high probability that personal judgement
would be impaired, especially if the individual is also dehydrated, which could result in increased risk of injury or
death. This is reinforced by the history of self-rescuers,
which shows that hundreds of miners have died "sucking on
the ends of self-rescuers" 12 • However, few if any, have died
after reaching an emergency refuge station.
A NEW APPROACH
These observations led to the following conclusions:
• There is no entirely reliable, credible, "personal" entrapment procedure for EMP for the duration of a serious

fire.
• Emergency refuge stations are required and need to be
located to ensure all persons can access the station; the stations need to be designed to keep the occupants safe for up
to 8 hours before rescue. The design of emergency refuge
stations must be based on sound physiological and other
criteria (Brake and Bates, in prep).
• Second means of egress are not primarily for workers to
escape, but for mine rescue teams to access workers who
have taken refuge in emergency refuge stations.
• Miners at EMP may need to travel through smoke to get
to an emergency refuge station. To maximise the likelihood
that this could be done safely, the evacuation order must be
given as early as possible, and the message must reach the
miners as early as possible, while smoke levels are still
light.
• Previous tests of stench gas at EMP showed that it could
take up to two hours to evacuate the mine using stench gas
12 For example, in the 1972 Sunshine Mine (USA) fire in which
91 miners died, many died wearing their filter-type self-rescuer.
This problem is not confined to filter self-rescuers, as records from
South Africa show that from 1987 to 1994, 48 fatalities (17% fatality rate) occurred in spite of activation of self-contained selfrescuers (Anon, 1995). In the Moura coal mine disaster in Australia, two coal miners drove out of the mine, after the initial explosions, without donning their self-rescuer. They were in such a
hurry to get out, it never occurred to them to don their SCSR.
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and even this did not achieve 1OOo/o reliability. The radio
system, even though it is extensive, relies on a leaky feeder
antenna, and cannot guarantee reliable communication to all
areas, plus the antenna could be damaged in the frre and
most radios are vehicle mounted and therefore would not
reach persons who are distant to a vehicle. Furthennore,
most mobile equipment at EMP is air-conditioned to reduce
the heat and this compromises the stench gas warning. The
increased usage of respiratory protection can also result in
people not smelling weak stench gas signals. In addition,
stench gas cannot communicate anything more than an
evacuation order. It cannot, for example, indicate where the
fire is, or ask an unaccounted person to call in. Therefore a
faster and 100% effective system is required. This led to
adoption of a "through-the-rock" radio communication system 13 , which provides reliable one-way communication to
all persons.
• To ensure travel through smoke is possible, selfcontained self-rescuers are required. Experience at other operations shows that these must be worn to ensure they will
be available when required; at EMP, this has led to the
adoption of a 30 minute SCSR as standard requirement,
based on weight and size considerations.
• SCSRs are primarily for travelling through smoke to an
emergency refuge station; they are not primarily intended
for entrapment.
• It was also at this point that the decision was made to go
to oxygen-generating self-contained self-rescuers and not to
adopt filter-type self-rescuers 14 • The products of combustion
in an underground mine fire on electrical cables and other
plastics 15 , diesel plant, hydraulic power packs, conveyor
13 Such a system is the PEDm or Personal Emergency Device,
which relies on the fact that high-wattage, ultra low frequency
radio waves can travel through rock, similar to the way communication is achieved to deeply submersed submarines. The receiver is
retro-fitted to the standard cap lamp battery, and buzzes and
flashes the cap lamp when a message is received. The message is
displayed on a back-lit LCD display and the memory stores up to
three messages. When no message is being received the received
displays the time signal from the transmitter.
14 Even though at EMP, SCSRs are primarily to travel through
smoke and not for entrapment, it is recognised that if a person was
truly "trapped", for example, in a development end, then the SCSR
should protect them from POCs for at least the duration of the
SCSR. For a nominal 30 minute SCSR, this could be 100 minutes
for a person at rest.

15 The plastics of main concern are polyurethanes, nylon, and
PVC. All plastics give off copious quantities of carbon dioxide and
carbon monoxide when heated. However, dangerous concentrations of hydrogen cyanide are given off from polyurethane, nylon
and some other polymers when heated above 2000 C. This happens
whether the plastic is on fire or not, and even when there is no
oxygen present. PVC also releases hydrochloric and hydrofluoric
acids. Polyethylene and polypropylene give rise to only CO and
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belts, diesel fuel stores, explosives, ventilation bag and a
myriad of other sources are so varied and so toxic that filtertype self-rescuers were excluded from further consideration.
A further factor was that the Western Australian Government guidelines are strongly encouraging oxygengenerating self-rescuers, and in Queensland from 1 January
1998, only oxygen-generating self-rescuers can be provided
as new issues into coal mines.
• To ensure the evacuation order can be given as quickly
as possible, emergency procedures needed to be changed to
give the mine control officer the authority to issue this order. Previously, a very formal process of entering "yellow
alert", "red alert" and "double red alert" was required before
an evacuation order could be issued at EMP.
With these key conclusions in place, the spacing of
Emergency refuge stations could be calculated.
Australian self-rescuers are generally rated under the
European standard, EN40 1, which provides for a breathing
rate of 35 litres per minute for a 70 kg worker. This is a
moderately hard work rate, and the duration of the rescuer
will be significantly longer (up to three times as long) at
rest.
Nevertheless, it is good practice (Anon, 1997) to de-rate
the SCSR to 60% of its nominal duration to allow for heavier persons (the 95th percentile). For a 30 minute unit, this
means it isde-rated to 18 minutes.
A good practice design speed for escape under good
conditions is 4.5 kph (Anon, 1997). Under adverse conditions (e.g., dense smoke), escape speeds are reduced by 40%
(Anon, 1997). Therefore, assuming adverse conditions, no
person should be further than 18 mins x 4.5 kph x (1-40%)
or 750 (say) metres from an emergency refuge station at any
time. Full consideration must be given to the location of
these emergency refuge stations during routine mine planning and operational planning activities.
For mines or regions within mines where workers or
visitors are not required to wear SCSRs, the maximum distance from an ERS was recommended to be 5 minutes at 4.5
kph or 375m.
Note that these distances are towards the lower range of
other figures quoted which vary from 750 m to 1.5 km.
However, if a mine worker is not downwind of the fire, then
"any" distance to refuge is safe. It is only the workers who
are downwind of the fire who are at risk (at least initially)
and 750 m is a long way to be travelling through smoke.
Even with early warning systems, these workers are more
likely to smell or see the smoke before receiving any warning. Fires on underground vehicles produce large volumes
of black, toxic fumes within minutes of the fire starting.

C0 2 when heated, provided other materials such as plasticisers or
fillers are not present. (Greig, 1989).

Providing the evacuation order is given early, most
workers will be able to access an emergency refuge station
within 750 meters I 4.5 kph or about 10 minutes. In fact,
most workers will be less than 750 m away and will be at
the Emergency refuge station within about 5 minutes. This
is exactly what a good egress strategy needs: most affected
persons being able to escape to safety in very short time. In
fact, at EMP most workers will be at safety before the firstresponse Mine Rescue team can be assembled, and even
before the mine management can reach the command centre
(assuming an out-of-work hours fire).
In the EMP, this requirement for no person to be more
than 750 m from an emergency refuge station resulted in the
requirement for 22 relocatable Emergency refuge stations,
each designed to accommodate 8 persons (but in an emergency, more could be accommodated). Moreover, the three
existing cribrooms (lunch rooms) have been converted into
emergency refuge stations each capable of accommodating
40 to 100 persons. These precautions are necessary because
of the highly mobile nature of the workforce and the very
real possibility that a fire could occur during shift change or
meal breaks.
To ensure mine rescue resources can be targeted to "unaccounted" persons, it is important that workers do not
travel past the nearest Emergency refuge station, e.g., to
travel to the cribroom. At EMP, it could take 20 minutes for
persons to reach the main cribroom, even in a vehicle, and
much longer on foot. Moreover, if people do travel to the
nearest Emergency refuge station but do not reach it, then
the search area can be greatly reduced; the mine rescue team
will be able to start at the nearest station to the lost person's
workplace and work backwards.
All persons in EMP will need to know where the nearest
Emergency refuge station is at all times. This is difficult
with a highly mobile workforce, contractors and visitors.
Induction and annual refresher training is not effective in
this sort of role; instead it is planned to have workers use
their daily safety sheet, which is carried on their person, to
note where the nearest Emergency refuge station is. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the three cribrooms in EMP are all
being designed to function as large capacity Emergency
refuge stations to cover the situation where workers do
come back to these well-known facilities.
For persons who are working in remote areas out of
reach of an emergency refuge station, an egress permit to
work will be required, which will ensure special precautions
are in place in the event of a fire. Special barricades and
signs will delineate these areas.
There are two other key items required in this overall
strategy. The first is an effective personnel disk board (tagging system), to ensure speed and reliability in accounting
for persons in the event of an egress being triggered. The
effectiveness of the overall program is reduced if persons
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rapidly get to safety, but confusion and delays then occur in
accounting for those who are safe versus those unaccounted.
The second is a fire detection system to provide early
warning of a fire. Investigations are currently underway to
selectively adapt coal mining technology to the underground metal mining situation. Metal mines typically have
much more intense use of diesel powered equipment and of
blasting fumes than in coal mines, and this must be taken
into account in the choice of sensors and the gas protocol to
ensure there is not an unrealistic number of nuisance trips.

FEASIBILITY, PRE-PRODUCTION AND
CONSTRUCTION ISSUES AND FORMAL RISK
ASSESSMENTS AND AUDITS
As with many projects, the highest workforce numbers and
least familiar workforce often occur during the construction
phase of the project. Activities in this phase are "one offs"
compared to the more routine nature of activities once production is established. Fire hazards are high. Special effort
needs to be made to ensure emergency egress capability is
as good during construction as during production. In effect,
EMP waS faced with considering two phases of emergency
egress: one for the construction phase where the workforce
would be hirge and inexperienced in the underground environment, and the second for the on-going operation.
It is also crucial that the separate issues of emergency
egress at both the fmal production stage and during construction be given proper consideration during the feasibility
study. This should not have to be done "on the run" once
the construction program has started. Critical issues are the
integrity of the primary air intakes. What happens if various
combinations of surface or underground fans go off-line? If
there is a total surface and underground power failure, what
happens to the primary ventilation? What effect does natural
ventilation energy have? Will the direction of airflow reverse and how long will this take to occur? What environmental conditions will be experienced?
There is a tendency for the key design concepts of even
the most carefully crafted egress system to be "lost in time",
particularly with turnover in mine planning and operations
personnel. Any critical aspect of the egress system cannot
just be recorded in some notes or a report. Mine design
working drawings and check -lists must be annotated to ensure key egress design criteria are not forgotten in the fu-

ture.
Fonnal Concept, Design and Construction Risk Assessments (at each stage of plant engineering) have proved invaluable at EMP in assessing the sufficiency of emergency
egress procedures prior to commencing particular design or
construction activities underground. "Boilerplate" solutions
to egress problems, blindly applied for token compliance,
do not provide real answers to these problems. There is no
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substitute for formal, "first principles" risk assessments
which involve the operators and designers in the process.
Finally, there is a need to ensure, after the egress measures are implemented, that the original "residual risk rating"
has in fact been reduced to the desired level, and to ensure,
by auditing, that operational readiness is achieved and
maintained.

TRIGGERS FOR EGRESS
Whilst there are many valid reasons to evacuate a mine, the
following are some of the critical triggers with respect to
risk to personnel from fire:
• confirmed or suspected underground fire irrespective of
size (unless already extinguished),
• compromised primary ventilation system (fans and/or
intakes, ventilation controls) which impacts on the integrity
or readiness of the egress system,
• failure of mine fire fighting systems (e.g., loss of water
supply if the mine partly relies on sprinkler systems),
• compromised primary ventilation intake air (an example
could be a surface fire or chemical spill which could affect
the fresh air intakes. For this reason, great care should be
taken in allowing combustible or toxic material (diesel fuel
storage, heavy vegetation, ammonia refrigeration plants,
etc) near fresh air intakes,
• seriously compromised egress system equipment (communication equipment, breathable air systems, recall of selfrescuers, etc).

THE OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY
Methods of directing fire fighting in mines have been described elsewhere (De Klerk, 1998). However, EMP experience is that key points include:
Early alarm and evacuation. It is critical to ensure that as
soon as a frre is suspected, someone on site has the authority
and is required to order an evacuation. Some "false alarms"
will inevitably disrupt production but better this than time
being lost in a real emergency. The mine manager or another off-site or off-duty executive should not be the only
person empowered to order an evacuation. Two examples
tragically illustrate this point:
• The Sunshine mine disaster of 1972 started with a small
fire while the senior mine management were 45 miles
away attending a stockholders meeting. With insufficient
experienced staff on site, the fire became much larger
and claimed 91 mine workers.
• In the Wilberg mine fire in 1984, senior mine management had gone underground to witness an attempt to
break a production record. They were trapped behind the
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fire and 8 senior mine managers along with 19 other
mine workers ultimately lost their lives.
Keeping the ventilation system intact. Large metal mines
tend to have very complex, three-dimensional ventilation
circuits. It is highly desirable for the primary ventilation
system to remain intact and functioning normally during the
fire (explosions have occurred through carbon monoxide, a
POC, being drawn back over the fire because of reversals in
the ventilation system). This improves the security of the
remaining circuits and therefore enhances the probability of
successful egress for those who are underground. Some
exceptions to this rule exist, but these usually relate to
situations where the security of the primary intake itself is
threatened. The on-going integrity of the primary intakes to
unaffected working areas is paramount in a mine fire.
Does the fire need to be fought? Fighting an underground
fire is a hazardous activity. Generally, the safest course of
action is to let the fire burn itself out (or at least reduce in
intensity), providing it has been contained and no personnel
are at risk.
Buying time. Enormous confusion and conflicting reports
occur in the early stages of a mine fire. A critical objective
of the fire director is to buy as much time as possible without putting lives at further risk. This reinforces the point that
a good strategy is to get people to safety quickly so that
there is time to consider further options and to resolve the
confusion and conflicting reports.
Targeting search and rescue resources. Simultaneously
fighting a fire and searching for and rescuing lost workers
requires a large number of highly trained personnel. It is
crucial that search and rescue resources can be targeted and
not sent off looking for workers in the wrong place, or
workers who are already safe. If personnel tagging systems
are used in the mine, these tags must be able to be interrogated during the mine fire. By implication, the location of
these tags needs itself to be secure and accessible.
Mechanisticapproach. Mine officials are rarely experienced in fighting frres or in managing emergency egress
situations. Training is of some value. However, it is imperative that a control room exists which has "boards" for all the
relevant information on its walls. Even the inexperienced
fire director who is under great pressure and not necessarily
thinking clearly can then see visual "memory prompts" reminding him of the sorts of activities he should be doing or
monitoring during the course of the emergency. The key
issues the fire director needs to know to safely manage the
fire must not be available only via a lengthy, difficult to fmd
and usually outdated written report.

ONE FINAL POINT: LEADERSHIP
There is one almost overriding additional requirement for a
sound emergency strategy in any mine: this is the support of

line and senior management. Unless senior management
believes mine workers need a fair chance of survival in the
remote likelihood of a fire or other emergency, resources
will not be made available for the strategy to be developed
and implemented. Just as it costs serious money to equip a
hotel building or factory with fire escapes, smoke detectors
and remote alarms, so too, providing a credible escape strategy for an underground mine will cost serious money.
Then there is the issue of support from the line: line
management must also positively support the arrangements,
otherwise they will be poorly implemented or not maintained and when required, they will not perform.
At its most basic level, this resolves down to leadership:
committed, enthusiastic, consistent leadership is required for
any mine to develop and maintain a credible escape strategy
with a high on-going degree of operational readiness.

SUMMARY
After attaining full production, Enterprise Mine will be the
primary source of copper production for Mount Isa for at
least the next 15 years. It has some unique features that have
led to the development of leading-edge technologies and
practices in a number of areas. A comprehensive emergency
egress plan has been adopted by EMP which will result in
acceptably low levels of residual risk for the workforce,
even in the event of a remote probability catastrophe such as
a major fire underground. This strategy will also significantly enhance the ability of Mine Rescue to rapidly complete search and rescue operations at greatly reduced risk to
the mine rescue teams themselves.
This strategy is built around the following key principles, which are listed in decreasing priority according to
their individual impact on reduction in overall residual risk
atEMP:
• The earliest possible notification of the fire from mine
control to the workforce using a through-the-rock communication system.
• Emergency Refuge Stations to ensure all persons can
reach safety within 30 minutes of the alarm and 95% of
persons can reach safety within about 5 minutes
• Revised Emergency Procedures to ensure the early
warning technology and the close proximity of Emergency
refuge stations can be used to full advantage to target search
and rescue operations
• The use of belt-worn self-contained self-rescuers to ensure all persons can get to an emergency refuge station
• An effective Tagging System to ensure reliability and
speed in accounting for all persons in the mine
• Fire Detection and gas protocols to provide the earliest
possible warning of the occurrence of fire
It is important to recognise that this egress strategy is
dependent on the risks at the individual mine. The conclu-

AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR EMERGENCY EGRESS
FROM AN UNDERGROUND METAL MINE
sions in this paper should not be copied into other operations without a full risk assessment being carried out.
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